Relationship between executive remuneration and performance of South African mining companies

Journal of Economic and Financial Sciences

 
 
Field Value
 
Title Relationship between executive remuneration and performance of South African mining companies
 
Creator Siwendu, Tando O. Swanepoel, Matthys J. Stumke, Olive
 
Subject agency theory; chief executive officer; company financial performance; corporate governance; executive remuneration; mining sector.
Description Orientation: Managers are supposed to manage companies to maximise shareholders’ wealth. Instead, there are long-standing perceptions that managers are rent extractors who maximise their own wealth, implying a misalignment between executive remuneration and company performance.Research purpose: The purpose of this study was to determine the existence of a relationship between executive remuneration and the financial performance of South African-listed mining companies.Motivation for the study: Executive remuneration significantly increased over the past five decades relative to company financial performance. The mining sector was selected due to its susceptibility to external factors and shocks leading to volatility in the financial performance of mining companies.Research approach/design and method: This study was a quantitative archival study, using data from 2015 to 2021, by applying the hierarchical linear modelling technique at a 95% confidence level and a 5% significance level.Main findings: The study found a weak to strong relationship between executive remuneration and company financial performance. Furthermore, an analysis of executive remuneration revealed an increase in short-term incentive payments and a decrease in the fixed salary as a proportion of chief executive officer remuneration.Practical/managerial implications: Because the study found a strong link between executive remuneration and earnings-based financial performance metrics, governing bodies should ensure that financial performance metrics include cash flow-based financial metrics as company earnings are highly susceptible to management manipulation.Contribution/value-add: This study contributes to the existing literature on executive remuneration and will be useful to researchers, shareholders, boards of directors, remuneration committees and policymakers.
 
Publisher AOSIS
 
Contributor None
Date 2024-01-23
 
Type info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion —
Format text/html application/epub+zip text/xml application/pdf
Identifier 10.4102/jef.v17i1.888
 
Source Journal of Economic and Financial Sciences; Vol 17, No 1 (2024); 12 pages 2312-2803 1995-7076
 
Language eng
 
Relation
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https://jefjournal.org.za/index.php/jef/article/view/888/1707 https://jefjournal.org.za/index.php/jef/article/view/888/1708 https://jefjournal.org.za/index.php/jef/article/view/888/1709 https://jefjournal.org.za/index.php/jef/article/view/888/1710
 
Rights Copyright (c) 2024 Tando O. Siwendu, Matthys J. Swanepoel, Olive Stumke https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
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