Record Details

Variable executive remuneration and company performance: Insights from the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, South Africa

Acta Commercii


 
 
Field Value
 
Title Variable executive remuneration and company performance: Insights from the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, South Africa
 
Creator Naik, Minal Padia, Nirupa Callaghan, Chris W.
 
Subject Commerce; Business; Remuneration executive remuneration; firm performance; corporate governance; human resource management; South Africa
Description Orientation: Agency theory predicts that agency relationships are subject to the principal-agent problem. Other theories also suggest that executives may tend to maximise sales revenues, or expand their spans of influence through growth, at the expense of the net value of the firm or its profitability.Research purpose: The purpose of this study is to test which forms of company performance are associated with higher executive variable pay ratios or determine the proportion of variable director remuneration to total remuneration.Motivation for the study: The extent to which variable remuneration is associated with different types of firm performance is unclear.Research design, approach and method: This study applies a simple panel regression model to test the extent to which the variable ratio of total director remuneration contributes differently to increases in firm revenue, total assets, return on assets, or measures of Tobin’s Q. These relationships are tested for listed companies on South Africa’s Johannesburg Stock Exchange, South Africa, for the years 2011–2014.Main findings: Variable remuneration is found to be negatively and strongly related to total revenue and negatively and weakly related to total assets (the gross measures of performance). In contrast, variable remuneration is weakly and positively related to Tobin’s Q, a measure which better reflects the interests of shareholders than gross measures.Practical/managerial implications: Firms in this context should seek to strengthen the linkages between variable remuneration and forms of performance that reflect the interests of stakeholders.Contribution/value-add: In the wake of global and local governance failures, this study suggests that the use of the variable component of executive remuneration might be helpful in aligning stakeholder interests. Further research might seek to better understand the causal mechanisms that underlie these findings.
 
Publisher AOSIS
 
Contributor
Date 2020-03-19
 
Type info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion — Regression analysis
Format text/html application/epub+zip text/xml application/pdf
Identifier 10.4102/ac.v20i1.790
 
Source Acta Commercii; Vol 20, No 1 (2020); 10 pages 1684-1999 2413-1903
 
Language eng
 
Relation https://actacommercii.co.za/index.php/acta/article/view/790/1352 https://actacommercii.co.za/index.php/acta/article/view/790/1351 https://actacommercii.co.za/index.php/acta/article/view/790/1353 https://actacommercii.co.za/index.php/acta/article/view/790/1350
 
Coverage — — —
Rights Copyright (c) 2020 Minal Naik, Nirupa Padia, Chris W. Callaghan https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0