CEO pay-performance sensitivity in the South African context

South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences

 
 
Field Value
 
Title CEO pay-performance sensitivity in the South African context
 
Creator Bussin, Mark
 
Description The topic of executive pay-performance sensitivity has resulted in mixed research findings. Literature related to executive remuneration constructs, company performance measures and the underlying theories is critically reviewed in this article. The literature is compared to research findings within the South African context pre, during and post the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. The researcher found similar results in the South African context compared to research in other countries and industries. The research challenges the notion that there is one dominant theory driving CEO compensation. The principal-agent theory, supported by the optimal contract theory, are foremost during periods of strong economic performance, while the influence of managerial power and other behavioural theories appear to prevail during periods of weak economic performance. This article proposes some critical considerations in order to manage this tension.
 
Publisher AOSIS Publishing
 
Contributor
Date 2015-05-28
 
Type info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion —
Format application/pdf
Identifier 10.4102/sajems.v18i2.838
 
Source South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences; Vol 18, No 2 (2015); 232-244 2222-3436 1015-8812
 
Language eng
 
Relation
The following web links (URLs) may trigger a file download or direct you to an alternative webpage to gain access to a publication file format of the published article:

https://sajems.org/index.php/sajems/article/view/838/541 https://sajems.org/index.php/sajems/article/downloadSuppFile/838/344
 
Rights Copyright (c) 2015 Mark Bussin https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
ADVERTISEMENT